Network Flow Routing under Strategic Link Disruptions by Dahan, Mathieu & Amin, Saurabh
ar
X
iv
:1
51
2.
09
33
5v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
6 J
an
 20
16
Network Flow Routing under Strategic Link
Disruptions
Mathieu Dahan
Center for Computational Engineering (CCE)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139
Email: mdahan@mit.edu
Saurabh Amin
Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139
Email: amins@mit.edu
Abstract— This paper considers a 2-player strategic game
for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender)
routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective
flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker)
simultaneously disrupts one or more links to maximize her
value of lost flow but also faces cost of disrupting links. This
game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. Linear
programming duality and the max-flow min-cut theorem are
applied to obtain properties that are satisfied in any mixed Nash
equilibrium. In any equilibrium, both players achieve identical
payoffs. While the defender’s expected transportation cost
decreases in attacker’s marginal value of lost flow, the attacker’s
expected cost of attack increases in defender’s marginal value
of effective flow. Interestingly, the expected amount of effective
flow decreases in both these parameters. These results can be
viewed as a generalization of the classical max-flow with mini-
mum transportation cost problem to adversarial environments.
I. INTRODUCTION.
We study a two-player strategic game over a directed
network in which player 1 (defender or agency) chooses a
flow to be routed from a source node to a destination node,
and player 2 (attacker or interdictor) chooses to disrupt one or
more edges. The payoff structures in this game are motivated
by the previous formulations in both network interdiction
problems [1], [2], [3] and attacker-defender games [4], [5],
[6]. In our model, we account the value of the effective
flow and the transportation cost for the defender, and the
value of the lost flow and the cost of attack for the attacker.
Specifically, the player 1’s payoff increases in the amount of
effective flow that reached the destination node, but decreases
with the cost of transporting the initial flow chosen by her.
The player 2’s payoff increases in the amount of lost flow as a
result of an attack and decreases with the size of attack. This
two player game is strictly equivalent to a strictly competitive
game (SCG).
We characterize the Nash equilibria for this game for a
special class of networks. We show that our game retains
some of the nice properties of SCGs. For example, we
prove that each player has a unique payoff value in all
equilibria. We show that every Nash equilibrium gives a
minimaximizing strategy for each player, but the converse
is not true. Interestingly, there is a unique maximinimizing
strategy but it is not a Nash strategy. Using a combination
of game-theoretic ideas and duality results such as the max-
flow min-cut theorem, we are able to compute the values
of effective and lost flow and the costs of transportation
and attack in terms of the parameters of the game. We also
relate the structure of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of
the game to the solutions of the maximum flow minimum
transportation cost problem and to the minimum cuts.
Network interdiction problems have already been widely
studied, but our focus is to extend these formulations to
simultaneous game settings. Related to our approach is the
article by Washburn and Wood [7]. The authors model a
sequential game, where the defender (leader) chooses one
s−t path and then the interdictor (follower) inspects one arc.
The objective of this sequential game model is to maximize
the probability with which the operator is detected by the
interdictor. Our game differs from the model in [7] in that
we model a simultaneous game, which captures each player’s
strategic uncertainty about her opponent. Secondly, we allow
both players to have a much larger set of actions (feasible
flow that may contain many s−t paths and loops, and attacks
that can disrupts several edges at the same time). Finally,
we account for the attacker’s cost of attack as well as the
defender’s cost of transporting flow through the network.
Another relevant line of work is by Bertsimas et al. [8].
In this sequential game, the operator first chooses a feasible
flow, and then the interdictor disrupts a fixed number of
edges. The goal is to minimize the largest amount of flow
that reaches the destination node. The authors consider two
different models for the disruption: an arc-based formulation
where the flow can be rerouted when there is an attack,
and a path-based formulation where the flow carried by a
disrupted edge is lost. Our formulation is related to the path-
based formulation: since we model a simultaneous game, it is
reasonable to assume that the flow through disrupted edges is
lost and cannot be re-routed. Although, in [8], the interdictor
can disrupt several edges at the same time, she must always
disrupt the same number of edges for every action, which is
still a restriction of the set of actions we considered for our
interdictor.
The work of Gueye et al. [4] (also see [9]) is one of the
first works to model a simultaneous attacker-defender game,
where the defender (operator) chooses how to send a feasible
flow that satisfies the supply and demand constraints (these
are exogenous parameters), and the attacker disrupts a single
edge of the network. Once again, the utility of the operator
only takes into account the amount of flow that reaches the
destination node. Similar to [4], our model also considers
that the attacker’s payoff depends on the amount of lost flow
and on the cost of attack. However, in our model, the cost of
attack is proportional to the capacities of the edges whereas
Gueye et al. only consider a constant cost of attack. Another
notable difference is that [4] only considers an uncapacitated
graph with given supplies and demands, and we consider
a capacitated graph with no constraint on the supplies and
demands.
Finally, our model is closely related to the work of Hong
and Wooders [10]. The authors model a two player simul-
taneous game in which an operator chooses a feasible flow
and an interdictor disrupts edges of the network, preventing
the flow from reaching the destination node. The operator’s
utility accounts for the amount of flow that reaches the
terminal node and the corresponding cost of transportation.
However, in [10], the operator’s utility is assumed to increase
with the cost of attack. This is a central point of departure
between their work and ours. Specifically, in our model, the
interdictor’s utility decreases with the cost of attack. While
the results in [10] are based on a max-flow and a min-cut
of the graph, we relate Nash equlibria of our game with the
solutions of the max-flow with minimum transportation cost
problem and with min-cuts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II
we discuss the main assumptions and present our game
model. Section III presents our main results on the charac-
terization of Nash equilibria of the game. The implications
of relaxing some of the modeling assumptions are discussed
in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM
A. Preliminaries
Consider a capacitated directed graph G = (V , E) where V
(resp. E) represents the set of nodes (resp. the set of edges) of
G. For each edge (i, j) ∈ E , let cij ∈ R+ denote its capacity,
which is the maximum amount of commodity that can pass
through (i, j). Let s ∈ V denote a source node and t ∈ V a
destination node. The flow can only enter the network from
s and leave from t, and there is no demand or supply at the
nodes that are different from s and t. A flow, denoted x, is a
function from E to R+ that assigns to each edge the amount
of commodity that goes through it. For notational simplicity,
let xij := x((i, j)) denote the flow through edge (i, j). Let
F denote the set of feasible flows, where a flow x is said to
be feasible if it satisfies flow conservation at each node and
if the flow through each edge does not exceed its capacity:
∀i ∈ V\{s, t},
∑
(j,i)∈E
xji =
∑
(i,j)∈E
xij ,
∀(i, j) ∈ E , 0 ≤ xij ≤ cij .
Let Λ denote the set containing all the loops and s− t paths
(i.e., a path that starts from s and ends at t) of the network,
and xλ the quantity of flow of x sent through λ ∈ Λ. Then
the edge flows and path/loop flows satisfy:
∀(i, j) ∈ E , xij =
∑
{λ∈Λ | (i,j)∈λ}
xλ (1)
An s − t cut is a partition {S, T } of the set of nodes V ,
such that s ∈ S and t ∈ T . We define the cut-set of {S, T }
as E({S, T }) = {(i, j) ∈ E | i ∈ S, j /∈ S} and the capacity
of {S, T } as C({S, T }) =
∑
(i,j)∈E({S,T}) cij . Let us recall
the max-flow problem:
maximize F (x)
subject to
∑
(j,i)∈E
xji =
∑
(i,j)∈E
xij , ∀i ∈ V\{s, t}
0 ≤ xij ≤ cij , ∀(i, j) ∈ E
where F (x) =
∑
{i∈V | (i,t)∈E} xit denotes the amount of
flow passing from the source s to the sink t. The well-known
max-flow min-cut theorem by Ford and Fulkerson [11] states
that the optimal value of the maximum flow problem is equal
to the minimum capacity over all s − t cuts. We use Θ to
denote the optimal value of the max-flow problem.
We also state the maximum flow minimum transportation
cost problem by Edmonds and Karp [12] in which the goal is
to find a maximum flow with minimum transportation cost:
(P) minimize
∑
(i,j)∈E
bijxij
subject to x ∈ F
F (x) ≥ F (x′) , ∀x′ ∈ F
where for every edge (i, j) ∈ E , bij ∈ R+ denotes the cost
of transporting one unit of flow through (i, j). We denote
the set of optimal solutions of problem (P) by Ω.
B. Model
We focus on a simultaneous two-player strategic game
Γ := 〈{1, 2}, (F ,A), (u1, u2)〉 defined as follows: player 1
(P1) is the defender (agency) who chooses to route a flow
x ∈ F through the network, and player 2 (P2) is the attacker
(interdictor) who chooses an attack µ to disrupt a subset of
edges of graph G; see (2). The set of actions for P1 (resp.
P2) is given by F (resp. A := {0, 1}E).
An attack µ is a function from E to {0, 1} defined as
follows:
µij := µ((i, j)) =
{
1 if (i, j) is disrupted,
0 otherwise. (2)
For our simultaneous game, it is reasonable to assume that
after an edge is disrupted (or attacked) by P2, the flow that
was supposed to cross this edge (if there were no attack) is
lost and not re-routed.1 Thus, the effective flow, denoted xµ,
1We do not consider attacks that can only result in partially disrupted
edges and might still permit some flow to pass through the attacked edges.
when the flow x is chosen by P1 and the attack µ is chosen
by P2 can be expressed as follows:
∀(i, j) ∈ E , xµij =
∑
λ∈Λµ
ij
xλ,
with Λµij := {λ ∈ Λ | (i, j) ∈ λ and ∀(i′, j′) ∈ λ, µi′j′ = 0}.
That is, the effective flow through an edge is the sum of all
the initial path flows that go through that edge and that do
not contain any attacked edge.
Example 1: Consider the flow chosen by P1 in Fig. 1a. If
P2 chooses to disrupt edges (1, t) and (s, 2), the unit flows
through paths {s, 1, t} and {s, 2, t} are lost. The resulting
effective flow is shown in Fig 1b.
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µs2 = 1
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µ1t = 1
(a) Initial flow and attack.
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(b) Resulting effective flow.
Fig. 1: Example graph.
The payoff of P1 is defined as follows:
u1(x, µ) = p1 F (x
µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of effective flow
− C1(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
transportation cost
, (3)
where p1 ∈ R+ is the marginal value of the flow assessed by
P1 and C1(x) :=
∑
(i,j)∈E bijxij is the cost of transporting
the initial flow x. Thus, when one additional unit of flow
reaches t, P1’s payoff increases by p1 and at the same time
decreases by its transportation cost.
The payoff of P2 is defined as follows:
u2(x, µ) = p2 F (x− x
µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of lost flow
− C2 (µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of attack
, (4)
where p2 ∈ R+ is the marginal value of the lost flow to P2,
(in general, p1 6= p2) and C2 (µ) :=
∑
(i,j)∈E cijµij is the
cost of the attack µ. Thus, if the disruption of an edge induces
the loss of one unit of flow, the payoff of P2 increases by
p2, and at the same time decreases by the disruption cost,
equal to the edge capacity.
We allow both players to randomize over their set of pure
actions. Let ∆(F) and ∆(A) denote the mixed extensions
of P1 and P2 pure strategies, respectively, i.e.:
∆(F) =
{
σ
1
∈ [0, 1]F
∣∣∣ ∑
x∈F
σ
1(x) = 1
}
,
∆(A) =
{
σ
2
∈ [0, 1]A
∣∣∣ ∑
µ∈A
σ
2(µ) = 1
}
.
For notational simplicity, we define σ1x := σ1(x) and σ2µ :=
σ2(µ). Given any function ϕ : F × A −→ R and any
strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ ∆(F) × ∆(A), we denote
Eσ [ϕ(x, µ)] :=
∑
x∈F σ
1
x
∑
µ∈A σ
2
µ ϕ(x, µ) the expectation
of ϕ with respect to σ. Then, the respective expected payoffs
can be expressed as:
U1(σ
1, σ2) = p1Eσ [F (x
µ)]− Eσ [C1(x)] (5)
U2(σ
1, σ2) = p2Eσ [F (x− x
µ)]− Eσ [C2 (µ)] (6)
A mixed strategy profile (σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈ ∆(F)×∆(A) is a
Nash Equilibrium (NE) if:
∀σ1 ∈ ∆(F), U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≥ U1(σ
1, σ2
∗
), (7)
∀σ2 ∈ ∆(A), U2(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≥ U2(σ
1∗, σ2). (8)
Equivalently, at NE, σ1 (resp. σ2) is a best response to σ2
(resp. σ1). The support of σ1 (resp. σ2) is supp(σ1) = {x ∈
F | σ1x > 0} (resp. supp(σ2) = {µ ∈ A | σ2µ > 0}).
Our objective is to characterize the set of NE of Γ, denoted
SΓ, under the following assumption:
Assumption 1: Let α := minλ∈Λpath
∑
(i,j)∈λ bij . There
exists an optimal solution of (P), denoted x∗ that takes s− t
paths with marginal transportation cost equal to α, i.e.,
∃x∗ ∈ Ω | ∀λ ∈ Λpath, xλ > 0 =⇒
∑
(i,j)∈λ
bij = α,
where Λpath is the set containing all the s− t paths of the
network.
This assumption implies that if x∗ ∈ Ω denotes a max-flow
with minimum transportation cost, the cost of transporting a
unit flow through each s− t path taken by x∗ is identically
equal to α. In addition, every other path in the network
cannot have a smaller marginal transportation cost. Note
that the case when every s − t has an identical marginal
transportation cost is a special case of this assumption. We
illustrate Assumption 1 with the following example:
Example 2: Consider the network flow problem in Fig. 2.
There is a unique maximum flow with minimum transporta-
tion cost x∗ which carries 1 unit of flow through paths
{s, 2, 4, t}, {s, 2, 3, t} and {s, 1, t}. Thus, the total amount of
flow is equal to 3 units. In this network, α = 3, and each path
taken by x∗ has a marginal transportation cost equal to 3 so
the cost of transporting x∗ is equal to 9. The remaining paths
that are not taken by x∗ are {s, 4, t} with a transportation
cost equal to 4, and {s, 1, 3, t} with a transportation cost
equal to 3. Thus, Assumption 1 is satisfied.
s
1
2 3
4
t
0,1,3
0,1,1
1,1,1
2,2,1
1,1,1
1,1,1 1,1,1
1,1,1
1,1,2
Fig. 2: Max-flow with minimum transportation cost (drawn
in blue). The labels of each edge correspond to the flow it
carries (blue), its capacity (red) and its transportation cost
(purple).
Admittedly, on one hand, Assumption 1 restricts the class
of networks on which the routing game Γ is played. On
the other hand, it permits us to obtain strong results on the
equilibrium structure.
Note that Γ can be easily extended to networks with mul-
tiple sources and multiple destination nodes. Given such a
network, one needs to add an extra source (resp. destination)
node and connect it to every existing source (resp. desti-
nation) node with an uncapacitated edge of transportation
cost equal to 0. This modification gives a new network with
single source and single destination. The outcome of the
game defined for the original network remains the same as
that of the game defined for the new network.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF NE OF Γ
In this section, we study the properties of the set of NE SΓ.
First, we argue that Γ is not an SCG. Recall that a two-person
game is said to be strictly competitive if, when both players
change their mixed strategies, either the expected payoffs
remain the same or one of the expected payoffs strictly
increases and the other strictly decreases. More precisely,
Γ can be shown to be not an SCG by arguing that u1 is
not an affine variant of −u2 in the sense of Adler et al. [13].
Although Γ is not an SCG, we can show that Γ is strategically
equivalent to a zero-sum game. The strategic equivalence
between Γ and a zero-sum game implies that SΓ is a convex
set.
First, we parametrically solve the game Γ and we present
NE whose support involves optimal solutions of (P) and
min-cuts.
Secondly, we focus on the region p1 > α, p2 > 1 which
only admits mixed NE and we present our main theorem
that provides analytical expressions of certain quantities of
interest at any NE. Specifically, we prove that each player
has a unique payoff value in all σ∗ ∈ SΓ and we characterize
the value of effective (resp. lost) flow and the cost of
transportation (resp. cost of attack) in terms of the parameters
of Γ: p1, p2, and α.
Third, we relate the mixed strategy NE of Γ to the
solutions of the max-flow minimum transportation cost prob-
lem (P), and also to the minimum cuts. Finally, we can
show that for every NE (σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈ SΓ, σ1
∗ (resp. σ2∗)
is a minimaximizer for player 1 (resp. player 2); but the
converse is not true. Also, for each player there is a unique
maximinimizing strategy but it is not a Nash strategy. For
the sake of brevity, we have omitted the proofs of several
lemmas and propositions.
A. Preliminary results
Let us first present the following lemma which states that
P1 does not choose a flow x that contains a loop.
Lemma 1: Any flow containing loops is not a best re-
sponse for P1.
That is, P1’s all strategies that contain loops are strictly
dominated, and they will not be in the support of a NE.
Thus, Λ in (1) can be restricted to the set of s− t paths.
In the rest of this paper, we use the following notations: x0
the action of not sending flow in the network, x∗ an optimal
solution of (P) that satisfies Assumption 1, µ0 the action of
not attacking any edge of the network, and µmin the action
that disrupts all the edges of a min-cut of the network.
The following propositions 1–3 provide that, for a given α,
the game Γ admits qualitatively different equilibria in regions
0 < p1 < α and p2 > 0 (Region I), p1 > α and 0 < p2 < 1
(Region II), and p1 > α and p2 > 1 (Region III). These
results are summarized by Fig. 3.
p10 α
p2
1
supp(σ1
∗
) = {x0}
supp(σ2
∗
) = {µ0} supp(σ1
∗
) = {x∗}
supp(σ2
∗
) = {µ0}
supp(σ1
∗
) = {x0, x∗}
supp(σ2
∗
) = {µ0, µmin}
I
II
III
Fig. 3: Support of equilibrium strategies in Regions I-III.
The following result states that no flow and no attack is
the unique NE of Γ in Region I:
Proposition 1 (Region I): If 0 < p1 < α, then SΓ =
{(x0, µ0)} with u1(x0, µ0) = 0 and u2(x0, µ0) = 0.
Intuitively, when 0 < p1 < α, the marginal value of
effective flow that reaches the destination node t is less than
the marginal transportation cost for every s-t path. Therefore,
P1 will face negative utility if she sends flow through the
network. Thus, in this case, her best response is not to route
any flow. Since no flow is sent by P1, P2’s best response is
not to attack, otherwise she faces the cost of attack without
any value from lost flow.
Next, for Region II, we obtain that max-flow with mini-
mum transportation cost and no attack is a pure NE:
Proposition 2 (Region II): If p1 > α and 0 < p2 < 1,
then ∀x∗ ∈ Ω, {x∗, µ0} ∈ SΓ. The corresponding payoffs
are u1(x
∗, µ0) = (p1 − α)Θ and u2(x∗, µ0) = 0.
This result can be explained as follows: on one hand,
since P2’s valuation of lost flow is small (p2 < 1), for any
attack, the utility gained from the lost flow is always lower
than the cost of attack. Therefore, P2’s best response is not
to attack any edge. On the other hand, P1’s valuation of
effective flow reaching t is higher than the disutility it faces
in transportation cost (p1 > α). Since P2 does not disrupt
any edge, every flow sent through the network reaches t;
thus, P1’s best response is to send a maximum flow. Among
the different maximum flows, the max-flows with minimum
transportation cost maximize P1’s equilibrium payoff.
Not that if p1 = α and p2 < 1, then both (x0, µ0) and
(x∗, µ0) are NE. The equilibrium payoffs are still (0, 0).
The following proposition 3 focuses on Region III:
Proposition 3 (Region III): If p1 > α and p2 > 1, then
Γ has no pure NE. Furthermore, ∃σ0 = (σ10 , σ20) ∈ SΓ
such that U1(σ10 , σ20) = U2(σ10 , σ20) = 0, and supp(σ10) =
{x0, x∗} and supp(σ20) = {µ0, µmin}. The corresponding
probabilities are given by:
• σ1x0 = 1−
1
p2
, σ1x∗ =
1
p2
• σ2µ0 =
α
p1
, σ2µmin = 1−
α
p1
.
From this result, we can make several useful observations.
First, in contrast to Prop. 1 and Prop. 2, in Region III,
both players must randomize their actions in any equilibrium.
Second, the equilibrium (σ10 , σ20), as defined in Prop. 3, can
be obtained from a solution of problem (P) and a min-cut
of the graph G.2 Third, (σ10 , σ20) has a particularly simple
structure, i.e., P1 either sends the whole max-flow with
minimum transportation cost, or does not send any flow in
the network. Similarly, P2 either disrupts all the edges of a
min-cut, or does not attack any edge of the network.
Finally, Prop. 3 is consistent with the game-theoretic
intuition: P1’s equilibrium strategy σ10 is characterized by
the parameter p2, and similarly, P2’s equilibrium strategy σ20
is characterized by the parameters p1 and α (which is given
and fixed under Assumption 1). This intuition can be further
explained as follows: as p2 increases, σ1x∗ decreases while
σ1x0 increases. When P2’s valuation of lost flow, p2, is large,
she has more incentive to attack, so any flow sent by P1 will
be more likely to be lost. Thus, P1 chooses not to send any
flow with higher probability than sending x∗. Likewise, as
p1 increases, σ2µmin increases while σ
2
µ0
decreases. Again,
when the marginal valuation of effective flow, p1, is large,
P1 will prefer to send as much flow as she can. Thus, P2
will be more likely to gain by inducing an important loss
to P1 by attacking a min-cut. We illustrate Prop. 1, 2 and 3
with an example.
Example 3: Consider the graph in Fig.4. We can see that
α = 3, and that the max-flow with minimum transportation
cost sends 1 unit of flow through {s, 1, 3, t}, {s, 2, 3, t} and
{s, 2, 4, t} that induce a transportation cost equal to 3 each.
Therefore, Assumption 1 is satisfied. It is easy to see that
the min-cut set is given by {(1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4)}.
s
1
2
3
4
t1,1 1,1
2,1
1,1
3,1
1,1
1,1
3,1
2,1
Fig. 4: Example network. Edge capacities and transportation
costs are denoted in red and purple labels respectively.
The NE described in Prop. 1, 2 and 3 are illustrated in
Fig. 5.
2Recall that, in general, computing an equilibrium and enumerating all
equilibria of general two-player non-zero sum games are computationally
involved problems [14], [15].
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1
1
2
1
s
1
2
3
4
t0 0
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
σ2
∗
µmin
= 1 −
3
p1
σ1
∗
x∗ =
1
p2
0 < p1 < α
0 < p2
α < p1
0 < p2 < 1
α < p1
1 < p2
I
II
III
Fig. 5: NE described in Prop. 1, 2 and 3.
B. Main Theorem
We now present our main result which identifies several
useful properties satisfied by all NE of Γ in Region III and
under Assumption 1.
Theorem 1: If p1 > α and p2 > 1, and under Assumption
1, then for any σ∗ ∈ SΓ:
1) Both players’ equilibrium payoffs are equal to 0, i.e.:
U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≡ 0 (9)
U2(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≡ 0 (10)
2) The expected amount of initial flow is given by:
Eσ∗ [F (x)] ≡
1
p2
Θ (11)
and the expected transportation cost is given by:
Eσ∗ [C1(x)] ≡
α
p2
Θ (12)
3) The expected cost of attack is given by:
Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)] ≡
(
1−
α
p1
)
Θ (13)
4) The expected amount of effective flow is given by:
Eσ∗ [F (x
µ)] ≡
α
p1p2
Θ. (14)
We refer the reader to Appendix for the proof. From Thm. 1
we observe that although SΓ is uncountable (following the
convexity of SΓ), the equilibrium values of common char-
acteristics, such as expected amount of initial and effective
flow, and expected transportation cost to P1 and the expected
cost of attack to P2, can be computed in closed-form using
the parameters of the game and using the optimal value Θ
of the max-flow problem. The payoffs of both players are
constant for any NE (ref. (9) and (10)). Below we further
explain the implications of Thm. 1.
First, following (11), the expected amount of initial flow is
always equal to some fraction of the amount of max-flow, and
this expectation decreases with p2. Likewise, following (13),
the expected cost of attack at any NE is always equal to
some fraction of the cost of attacking a min-cut, and this
expectation increases with p1.
Secondly, following (12), the expected cost of trans-
portation is always equal to some fraction of the cost of
transporting x∗ (indeed, C1(x∗) = αΘ by Assumption 1).
Notice that while α always governs the equilibrium strategy
of P2, it also affects P1’s equilibrium transportation cost.
Third, following (14), the expected amount of effective
flow is always equal to some fraction of the amount of max-
flow, and since α
p1p2
< 1
p2
this flow is always smaller than
the expected amount of initial flow. The expected amount
of effective flow decreases when p1 and/or p2 increase.
This is surprising because one might expect that if the
marginal value of effective flow increases, its expectation
would increase as well. This result can be explained by
noting that when p1 increases, the disruption caused by
P2 increases, so there is more lost flow and the expected
effective flow decreases.
Thm. 1 also enables estimation of the performance metrics
such as the expected amount of lost flow and the yield
of P1 in any NE. We define the yield as the ratio of the
expected amount of flow that reaches t (effective flow) and
the expected amount of flow that is sent through s (initial
flow). We have the following corollary:
Corollary 1: The expected amount of lost flow is given
by:
Eσ∗ [F (x− x
µ)] ≡
1
p2
(
1−
α
p1
)
Θ, (15)
and the expected yield is given by:
Eσ∗ [F (x
µ)]
Eσ∗ [F (x)]
≡
α
p1
. (16)
From (15), we note that the expected amount of lost flow
is always equal to some fraction of the amount of max-flow.
The corresponding coefficient increases with p1, because
when p1 is large, P1 sends more flow and P2 disrupts more
edges. However, the coefficient decreases when p2 increases,
mainly because when p2 is large, P2 causes more disruption
and P1 sends less flow in the network. Interestingly, we
obtain that the expected yield is a constant for all NE, and
it only depends on α and p1; neither p2 nor the maximum
amount of flow Θ affect the yield.
Finally, it is easy to check that all of these properties are
satisfied by (σ10 , σ20) defined in Prop. 3.
C. Additional properties
We now discuss additional properties satisfied by the NE
of Γ. The following result relates the NE of Γ with min-cuts
of the network G.
Proposition 4: ∀(σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈ SΓ, ∀µ ∈ supp(σ2
∗
):
C2 (µ) ≤ C2
(
µmin
)
= Θ,
∀(i, j) ∈ E , µij = 1 =⇒ ∀x
∗ ∈ Ω, x∗ij = cij .
From this result, we obtain that, in equilibrium, there will
be no attack that requires a cost of attack larger than the cost
of attacking a min-cut. In addition, for any NE, an edge is
disrupted with positive probability only if it is saturated by
every maximum flow with minimum transportation cost. In
other words, if there exists at least one maximum flow with
minimum transportation cost that does not saturate an edge,
then this edge will never be disrupted at equilibrium.
Proposition 5: Consider a min-cut E({S, T }), then:
∀(σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
) ∈ SΓ, ∀(i, j) ∈ E({S, T }), Eσ∗ [xij ] =
cij
p2
,
Furthermore, for any NE whose support is based on
attacks that only disrupt edges of E({S, T }) we have:
∀(i, j) ∈ E({S, T }), P ((i, j) is disrupted) = 1− α
p1
.
This proposition tells us that at any NE, the expected
amount of flow that goes through any edge of a min-cut
is always equal to a fraction of its capacity. In addition, if
P2’s equilibrium strategy only disrupts edges of one min-
cut, then the probability with which an edge is disrupted is
constant for all the edges of that min-cut, irrespective of the
capacities of these edges.
Corollary 2: ∀(σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈ SΓ, ∀ min-cut E({S, T }),
∀(i, j) ∈ E({S, T }) : ∃x ∈ supp(σ1
∗
) | xij > 0,
This corollary means that for any NE and for any edge of a
min-cut, there exists a flow chosen with non-zero probability
that passes through it.
All of these properties enable us to derive the following
bounds which are tight thanks to Prop. 3:
Proposition 6: Consider (σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈ SΓ. Then we have
the following bounds:
• If x0 ∈ supp(σ1∗), then σ1∗
x0
≤ 1−
1
p2
,
• If x∗ ∈ supp(σ1∗), then σ1∗x∗ ≤
1
p2
,
• If µmin ∈ supp(σ2∗), then σ2∗
µmin
≤ 1−
α
p1
,
• If µ0 ∈ supp(σ2∗), then σ2∗
µ0
≤
α
p1
.
This proposition gives bounds on the probability with
which x0, x∗, µ0, µmin are chosen when they are in the
support of a NE. From these upper bounds, we see that
when p2 is close to 1, the probability with which x0 can be
chosen becomes very small. On the contrary, it is when p2 is
large that x∗ can be chosen with small probability. Similarly,
when p1 is close to α, µmin can be chosen only with small
probability, and when p1 is large, µ0 can be chosen only
with small probability.
Recall the classical result in SCG that maximinimizers are
also NE. In the game Γ, x0 is a maximinimizer for P1 and
µ0 is a maximinimizer for P2. However, we already know
that if p1 > α and p2 > 1, there is no pure NE. Hence, the
maximinimizing strategies do not give NE, i.e., (x0, µ0) /∈
SΓ. Still, we have the following result:
Proposition 7: Each player’s payoffs for both maximini-
mizing and minimaximizing strategies are equal to the payoff
at NE, i.e.,
max
σ1
min
σ2
U1(σ
1, σ2) = 0 = min
σ2
max
σ1
U1(σ
1, σ2)
max
σ2
min
σ1
U2(σ
1, σ2) = 0 = min
σ1
max
σ2
U2(σ
1, σ2)
Furthermore, the set of minimaximizers is a superset of SΓ,
i.e., any NE is a minimaximizer.
IV. RELAXING ASSUMPTION 1
We now discuss an example that does not satisfy Assump-
tion 1. We consider the network given in Fig. 6:
s
1
2
t0,1,1
1,1,1
1,1,3
1,1,3
1,1,1
Fig. 6: Network that does not satisfy Assumption 1.
The unique max-flow with minimum transportation cost is
drawn in blue in Fig. 6. It sends one unit of flow through
path {s, 1, t} and one unit through path {s, 2, t}. They both
induce a marginal transportation cost equal to 4. However,
{s, 1, 2, t} has a marginal transportation cost equal to 3, so
Assumption 1 does not hold.
Now, we suppose that 3 < p1 < 4 and p2 > 1 then we can
prove that (σ1∗, σ2∗) defined by σ1∗x0 = 1 −
1
p2
, σ1
∗
x1 =
1
p2
,
σ2
∗
µ0 =
3
p1
, σ2
∗
µ1 = 1−
3
p1
is a NE (x1 sends one unit of flow
through path {s, 1, 2, t} and µ1 disrupts edge (1, 2)).
We can show that, in this case, the NE we presented
earlier cannot be found anymore, and the one we found is
not supported by any max-flow with minimum transportation
cost and any min-cut.
V. APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We will need the following lemma in the proof of the main
theorem:
Lemma 2:
∀(σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
) ∈ SΓ, Eσ∗ [F ((x
∗)µ)] = Θ− Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)]
(17)
Proof of Lemma 2: We can find a link between the expected
payoffs that we can write in two different ways:
U1(σ
1, σ2) =p1Eσ [F (x)]− Eσ [C1(x)]
−
p1
p2
Eσ [C2 (µ)]−
p1
p2
U2(σ
1, σ2) (18)
U2(σ
1, σ2) =− Eσ [C2 (µ)] + p2Eσ [F (x)]
−
p2
p1
Eσ [C1(x)] −
p2
p1
U1(σ
1, σ2) (19)
Let σ∗ = (σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈ SΓ. Since (σ10 , σ20) ∈ SΓ (Prop. 3),
(8) and (6) give us:
0 = U2(σ
1
0 , σ
2
0) ≥ U2(σ
1
0 , σ
2∗)
= Θ− Eσ∗ [F ((x
∗)µ)]− Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)]
So we get the first inequality:
Eσ∗ [F ((x
∗)µ)] ≥ Θ− Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)] (20)
Now, since (σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈ SΓ, (7), (5) and Assumption 1 give:
U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≥
p1
p2
Eσ∗ [F ((x
∗)µ)]−
α
p2
F (x∗) (21)
If we combine (18), (6) and (8), using σ20 , we get:
U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≤
p1
p2
(
C2
(
µmin
)
− Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)]
)
−
α
p2
C2
(
µmin
) (22)
By combining (21) and (22), and using the max-flow min-cut
theorem, we obtain:
Eσ∗ [F ((x
∗)µ)] ≤ Θ− Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)] (23)
Equations (20) and (23) lead to:
Eσ∗ [F ((x
∗)µ)] = Θ− Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)]
We are now ready to prove the main result.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let σ∗ = (σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈ SΓ. Let us
first show 3), but we will need a few equations before. First,
let’s prove that U1(σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
) ≥ 0. Equation (7) gives:
U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≥ U1(x
0, σ2
∗
) = 0 (24)
If we combine (24) and (22), we obtain:
Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)] ≤
(
1−
α
p1
)
C2
(
µmin
) (25)
In order to get the reverse inequality, let us consider the
strategy σ1ǫ defined by σ1x∗ =
1 + ǫ
p2
and σ1
x0
= 1 −
1 + ǫ
p2
.
For an ǫ small enough, (7), (5) and (17) give us:
U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≥
p1(1 + ǫ)
p2
(F (x∗)− Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)])
−
α(1 + ǫ)
p2
F (x∗) (26)
We just need to combine (22) and (26) in order to get:
Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)] ≥
(
1−
α
p1
)
F (x∗) (27)
Equations (25), (27) and the max-flow min-cut theorem give
us 3):
Eσ∗ [C2 (µ)] =
(
1−
α
p1
)
C2
(
µmin
)
=
(
1−
α
p1
)
Θ
(28)
We can now use this equation to prove that P1’s payoff is
equal to 0 at equilibrium: combining (28) and (22) lead to:
U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≤ 0 (29)
Therefore, (29) and (24) give:
U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) = 0 (30)
Let’s now show (11). Similarly, let’s first prove that
U2(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≥ 0 using (8):
U2(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≥ U2(σ
1∗, µ0) = 0 (31)
Then, (19), (30) and (28) give:
U2(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≤
(
1−
α
p1
)(
p2Eσ∗ [F (x)]− C2
(
µmin
))
(32)
If we combine (32) and (31), we obtain:
Eσ∗ [F (x)] ≥
1
p2
C2
(
µmin
) (33)
In order to get the reverse inequality, let us consider the
strategy σ2ǫ defined by σ2µ0 =
α− ǫ
p1
and σ2
µmin
= 1−
α− ǫ
p1
.
For an ǫ small enough, (18), (8), (6) and (28) give:
U1(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≤
ǫ
p2
C2
(
µmin
)
− ǫEσ∗ [F (x)] (34)
Equations (34) and (24) give us:
Eσ∗ [F (x)] ≤
1
p2
C2
(
µmin
) (35)
Equations (33), (35) and the max-flow min-cut theorem give
us:
Eσ∗ [F (x)] =
1
p2
F (x∗) =
1
p2
Θ (36)
Likewise, if we combine (36) and (32), we get:
U2(σ
1∗, σ2
∗
) ≤ 0 (37)
Equations (37) and (31) give us:
U2(σ
1∗, σ1
∗
) = 0 (38)
Thus 1) holds.
Now, if we combine (6), (36), (28) and (38), we show 4):
Eσ∗ [F (x
µ)] =
α
p1p2
Θ (39)
Lastly, if we combine (5), (39) and (30), we can show 2):
Eσ∗ [C1(x)]
α
p2
Θ (40)
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